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Being good in business is the mostfascinatingkind ofart.
INTRODUCTION

Artists have always loved to hate the art market. It degrades the ineffable "aura"
of their work by relinquishing it to commerce. Still they hunger for its approval. The
art market reifies art by reducing it to a price, but also promises artists untold fame,
fortune, and freedom. While it cannot give artists what they want, it can give them
what they need, if they are lucky enough to catch its fancy. The alternative is
irrelevance. So artists accept the art market out of necessity. The only question is
how they engage with it.
In theory, the art market is just where artists go to sell their work-to alienate it
by transferring ownership to a collector. But the alienation of a work of art is not as
simple as the sale of typical goods or services. Artwork is not just a commodity and
is never fully alienated. When artists sell their work, they retain a connection to it.
The artist's name and reputation will always be attached to the work, and just as the
work may help build the artist's name and reputation if acquired by a
well-known collector or a fancy museum or lauded by an influential critic, so the
artist's later activities may affect the value of their work after the fact.
As a consequence, artists have always claimed certain "moral rights" in their
works, with varying degrees of success. Usually, property owners can use their
property in any way they like. If you own a t-shirt and get tired of it, you can use it
as a rag or throw it away. Or if you own a pair ofjeans, you can cut off the legs and
make shorts. But moral rights may prevent the owner of an artwork from changing
or destroying it. For example, the moral right of integrity may prevent the owner of
an artwork from damaging it. Notably, these moral rights may apply long after an
artwork is purchased, and even if the buyer didn't agree to them. Different countries
recognize different moral rights, and the United States recognizes only limited moral
rights, but the very existence of moral rights suggests that artwork is "special" in
some way, normatively distinct from other forms of property.
Unsurprisingly, artists like moral rights, and want more. Among other things,
they want money. Specifically, they want a bigger cut of the art market. Initially,
artists just wanted their patrons to pay more for art. But when a sophisticated
secondary art market first emerged in the late 19th century, and when it exploded in
the mid-to-late-20th century, artists began to demand a percentage of the resale price
of their works. As the resale prices of the most desirable works skyrocketed, in part
due to the "appreciation" in the name and reputation of their creators, the artists
clamored ever more vigorously for a share of the secondary market for their works.
In response, many countries created resale royalty rights, which enable artists to
claim a percentage of the resale price of their artwork. The United States has not.
While Congress has considered many bills proposing the creation of a federal resale
royalty right, it has rejected all of them. And while California created a state resale

3

ANDY WARHOL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDY WARHOL (FROM A TO B AND BACK AGAIN) 92 (1975).
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royalty right in 1976, the Ninth Circuit recently held that it is preempted by the
Copyright Act.4
The normative case for statutory resale royalty rights is weak.' But mandatory
legislation may not be the only way for artists to claim resale royalties and other
"moral rights" of various sorts. Perhaps they could negotiate the rights and royalties
via contract. Artists typically sell their works to collectors on the primary market.
While artists usually sell their works outright, in theory, nothing prevents them from
retaining a residual interest in their works. Indeed, some artists have sold works
pursuant to contracts that entitle them to "moral rights" and to a percentage of the
resale price of the works and that require future buyers to agree to the same terms.
This Article focuses on the best-known example, the "Artist's Contract" developed
by Seth Siegelaub and Robert Projansky in 1971.6 This contract was promulgated as
a tool for artists to use in selling their works, retaining numerous rights in their art,
including resale royalty rights and numerous expansive moral rights, extending
beyond the artist's lifetime.
Legal doctrines currently stand in the way of contracts such as the Artist's
Contract. While such contracts may be enforceable against the original buyer, who
is a party to the contract, they are not enforceable against subsequent buyers, who
are not. The artist may be able to recover damages from the original buyer but cannot
compel subsequent buyers to agree to pay royalties and respect rights. Similarly,
property law generally prohibits servitudes on personal property, and contractual
resale royalties and additional "moral rights" amount to servitudes on artwork.
Typically, servitudes on personal property are inefficient, because the transaction
costs exceed the benefits. But sometimes they could make sense. In theory, resale
royalties are just futures contracts that artists can use to hedge against success, and
the market price of a work will be discounted to reflect the current value of the resale
royalty. There is a good argument that the law should honor such contracts. Artists
and collectors have different risk preferences, so perhaps they should be able to
contract for whatever terms they like.7

4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1976), invalidatedby Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1076
(9th Cir. 2018).
' See generally Brian L. Frye, Equitable Resale Royalties, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 237 (2017)
(discussing the justifications for a statutory resale right).
6 SETH SIEGELAUB & ROBERT PROJANSKY, TiE ARTIST's RESERVED RIGHTS TRANSFER AND SALE
AGREEMENT 1 (1971) [hereinafter ARTIST'S CONTRACT], http://primaryinformation.org/files/english.pdf

[https://perma.cc/KD7Y-5EE4].
There are a number of trenchant legal and economic analyses of moral rights, resale royalties, and
related issues. See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Casefor Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM
1, (2014); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Royaltiesfor Artists versus Royalties for Authors and
Composers, 25 J. CULTURAL ECON. 259 (2001); Henry Hansmam & Marina Santilli, Authors' and

Artists'MoralRights: A ComparativeLegaland EconomicAnalysis, 95 J. LEGAL STUD. 95,95-96(1997).
As one of us has shown, the enforceability "problem" of the artist's contract can actually be "solved"
through modern business entity law, although administrative and legal obstacles may remain. See

Christopher G. Bradley, Art LLCs: Sculpting Property Rights Through PrivateAgreement, TULANE L.
REV.

(forthcoming

2019),

[https://perma.cc/KYD7-4FLJ].

at

https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=33372 11
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But enforceability was never central to the Artist's Contract. Indeed, actually
using the Artist's Contract was almost beside the point. After all, as Stewart
Macaulay famously observed, even when breached, contracts are rarely enforced in
court.' While contractual agreements often reflect a mutual understanding, even
sophisticated parties rarely haggle over every term, or litigate when their
expectations are frustrated.9 Business dealings in practice tend to be more relational,
informal, and ad hoc than traditional legal doctrine suggests.
The primary purpose of the Artist's Contract was to use legal rhetoric to make an
ideological point and to promote particular forms of social change. By "legalizing"
the relationship between an artist and a collector, the Artist's Contract expressed the
expectations of the artists who insisted on it; it obtained the collector's statement of
assent to the artist's preferred re-framing of the post-sale relationship of artist,
collector, and artwork and it bolstered artists' status and solidarity as a class of
market actors. As one leading scholar of the contract and its milieu puts it, the Artist's
Contract deploys a "rhetoric of collectivity [that] can be viewed as a radical
appropriation of private law in an effort to establish more equitable art industry
norms." 0
We note that that this phenomenon is far from unusual. Socio-legal scholars have
long noted that legal language and legal tools are often deployed in service of goals
other than establishing or enforcing existing legal rights. The law can be seen as a
tool, and a reflection, of a particular form of "legal consciousness."" As scholars of
legal consciousness have shown, sometimes the tools of law are deployed to
demonstrate the injustice of the law, or of a particular social context; to signal
seriousness, a shift from a personal or informal, negotiable relationship to one
mediated by more objective, predetermined rules; or to catalyze political change by
inspiring a particular community to claim hitherto-unrecognized rights or status. The
Artist's Contract serves as an apt illustration of the use of legal terms and tools
(viz., contracts) to bring social change, to intervene in the social and economic
arrangements reflected in the art market.' 2

8See Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 55, 60-62 (1963).
9 See id. at 61.
"0 Lauren van Haaften-Schick, Conceptualizing Artists' Rights: Circulations of the SiegelaubProjansky Agreement through Art and Law, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE 1 (2018) (citing NAWC to
Issue New Contract, ART WORKERS NEWSLETTER (Nat'1 Art Workers Cmty., New York, N.Y.), May
1971), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb9780199935352-e-27?print=pdf [bttps://perma.cc/AT62-3ECX].
" See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE 3-54 (1998) (providing an influential framework of analysis of "legal consciousness");
SALLY MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE OR GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS
AMERICANS 37-63 (1990) (discussing legal consciousness); David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal
Culture, 29 AuSTL. J. LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (2004); Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN.
REV. L. & SOCIAL ScI. 323 (2005) (providing historically contextualized, critical survey of the field).
Stated most generally, "[t]he study of legal consciousness is the search for the forms of participation and
interpretation through which actors construct, sustain, reproduce, or amend the circulating (contested or
hegemonic) structures of meanings concerning law." Id. at 334.
12 van Haaften-Schick aptly terms these aspects the "social life of contracts." van Haaften-Schick,
supra note 10, at 21-24.
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Accordingly, this paper focuses on the rhetoric of the Artist's Contract, rather
than its substance. While the Artist's Contract was always largely unenforceable as
a matter of law, the available evidence suggests that some artists used it, and some
collectors still observed its terms. It impacted the way these artists and collectors
perceived their relationship to each other. While by any account its impact fell short
of its originators' hopes, it might have fulfilled more of those hopes than a traditional
legal analysis would suggest. At any rate its failure (if it should be called that) was
less as a legal document than as an attempt to catalyze social change.
This paper explores the function and purpose of the Artist's Contrast as a legal
document-but not from the perspective of legal enforceability, which is how legal
effectiveness is traditionally measured. Rather this paper tells the story of a document
that relies upon hallmarks of law (legal language, formality, specificity, and so on)
in order to express and attempt to consolidate particular views on artists, artworks,
the collectors to whom they sell, and the markets in which they sell. This powerful
connection inevitably continues past the moment of sale, and the Artist's Contract
can be read as an attempt to rearrange this connection, to intervene and alter it, to
adjust the perspectives of all those participating in it or observing it-all by means
of a particular, peculiar legal document. By our account, the goal of the document
was to rearrange relationships of creators and buyers of art not just in particular
transactions but on a much broader scale: to reshape norms of the marketplace and
conceptions of the relevant rights and responsibilities of market participants. It is in
the context of these complex social, cultural, and economic webs that the legal
document in question can be best understood.
I. AN ARTIST'S RIGHTS IN WORKS OF ART

Artists typically have an assortment of different rights in the works they create.
Like all other authors, artists own a copyright when they create an original work of
authorship." But artists may also have certain moral rights.14 In many countries,
those moral rights may include a resale royalty right.'I
A. Copyright in Works ofArt
Artists typically own a copyright in the works of art they create. The Berne
Convention requires its signatories to extend copyright protection to all authors,
including artists.' 6 Most non-Berne countries still provide copyright protection in
some form.' 7
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
§ 106A(a) (2012).
15 See Frye, supra note 5, at 241-46.
6 See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 1, Sept. 9,
1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
" Currently, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, and San Marino are among the few countries that are not signatories
1

14 17 U.S.C.

to the Berne Convention. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 38A: INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATONS OF

THE UNITED STATES 4-13 (2019), htips//www.copytightgov/circs/circ38apdf [httpsi//permacc/B2TV-GSYG].
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In the United States, the Copyright Act grants authors certain exclusive rights in
the "original works of authorship" they create." Accordingly, if an artist creates an
original work of authorship, then copyright in the work initially vests in the artist."
The exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act may vary depending on the
category of the work of authorship. 20 Typically, artists create "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works," 21 but contemporary artists may create works that fall into another
category, or no category.
Copyright, however, may not protect all works of art. For example, artists may
create works that copyright cannot protect because they are not "original" as defined
by the Copyright Act.22 Minimalist and conceptual art often fails to satisfy the
originality requirement. 23 In addition, copyright may not protect works that fall
outside of the enumerated categories of works of authorship.24
Notably, copyright only protects intangible "works of authorship," not tangible
"copies" of those works. Accordingly, when an artist creates a unique painting,
drawing, or sculpture, copyright protects the intangible work of authorship it
embodies, not the object itself, which is merely a unique "copy" of the work- 25 And
when the artist sells that copy to a collector, the artist retains the copyright in the
work.26 Of course, the artist may license the copyright in the work to the collector or
anyone else, and many uses of the work are non-infringing, including public
exhibition of the copy and reproduction permitted by fair use.27
Yet, for many artists, copyright is essentially irrelevant. Copyright enables
authors to internalize some of the positive externalities created by their work of
authorship by giving them the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute their work.
But most artists don't sell copies, they sell originals. The art market is not a
commodity market, but a scarcity market.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
'9 Id. § 201(a).
20 See id. § 102(a).
21 See id. § 102(a)(5).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, pt. 1, at 1039
(1976).
1"

' Lori Petruzzelli, Comment, CopyrightProblems in Post-ModernArt, 5 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L.

(1995) (discussing the lack of originality in minimalist and conceptual forms of art).
115, 2 121-23
4
See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346-51 (1991)
(holding that while factual compilations may receive copyright protection if they "feature[] an original
selection or arrangement of facts," the facts themselves do not).
25

See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).

26

id.

27

See, e.g., id. § 107.
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B. MoralRights in Works of Art
Artists may also have moral rights in the works of art they create. The Berne
Convention requires its signatories to give authors certain non-waivable moral rights
of attribution and integrity,2 8 among other things, and many countries have complied
with that requirement.29 The right of attribution typically empowers authors to
30
compel the attribution of works they created and disavow works they did not. The
right of integrity typically empowers authors to prevent the mutilation or destruction
of works they created, and to disavow damaged works."
When the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989, it did not
immediately create any new moral rights.32 The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
soon gave limited moral rights to some authors." Essentially, VARA gives the
4
authors of "works of visual art" limited rights of attribution and integrity.' It defines
"works of visual art" as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works that exist either "in a
single copy" or "in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author," and it only extends VARA rights to original
works of authorship that can be protected by copyright.'" Moreover, the VARA
rights of attribution and integrity are limited by fair use and the other statutory
exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright owners, which are waivable by the
author and expire at the death of the author.36 As a consequence, VARA rights are
considerably narrower than the moral rights required by the Berne Convention.
C. Resale Royalties on Works ofArt
In many countries, artists also have a resale royalty right in the works of art they
create.' 7 The Berne Convention requires its signatories to give authors a resale
royalty right.' 8 But it implicitly recognizes that not all of them will comply, providing
that authors can claim resale royalties only if their country of origin grants a resale

28 Berne Convention, supra note 16, art. 6bis.
2 Elizabeth Sch6r6, Where is the Morality? Moral Rights in InternationalIntellectualProperty and
Trade Law, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 773, 783 (2018) ("[M]ost Berne-signatories have incorporated the
minimum standard for moral rights into their national legislation.").

17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012).
id
32 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
33
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
' 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012).
3
1 Id. § 101.
36
Id. § 106A.
30
31

Frye, supra note 5, at 244-46.
Berne Convention, supra note 16, at art. 14ter ("The author, or after his death the persons or
institutions authorized by national legislation, shall, with respect to original works of art and original
manuscripts of writers and composers, enjoy the inalienable right to an interest in any sale of the work
subsequent to the first transfer by the author of the work.").
3

3'
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royalty right." While many Berne countries have created a resale royalty right, many
others have not, and the scope of the right varies considerably among countries.'
Specifically, the United States has not created a resale royalty right,4 1 and the Ninth
Circuit recently held that the Copyright Act preempts state resale royalty rights such
as those California sought to impose.42
II. THE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT
A droit de suite, or "resale royalty right," is a legal right to claim a percentage of
the resale price of a copy of a work of authorship.43 Typically, the resale royalty right
only applies to "unique copies" of a work, which may include "limited editions," but
not mass-produced copies.
In theory, copyright gives authors the right to claim a percentage of the sale price
of every copy of their works of authorship. Of course, in practice, most authors
license their works to a publisher and receive their percentage only indirectly, if aL
all. But in any case, their compensation depends on the reproduction and sale of
copies of their works.
Unfortunately, copyright can't help most visual artists, because they don't sell
reproductions of their work, they sell originals. The copyright market is a commodity
market that depends on volume, but the art market is a luxury market that depends
on scarcity. Authors in a commodity market want every fan to buy a copy, but artists
in a luxury market want every fan to fight over one copy. The exclusive right to make
copies is worthless if you don't intend to make any. What artists want is an equity
stake in their works, and thus a right to share in future profits."
A. The Origins ofthe Resale Royalty Right
The concept of a resale royalty right originated in late 19th century France. 45 As
the art market grew, the most desirable works became increasingly valuable on the
secondary market." Some artists were upset when collectors sold their works for a
39

Id. ("The protection provided by the preceding paragraph may be claimed in a country of the Union
only if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so permits, and to the extent permitted by
the country where this protection is claimed.").
4 Frye, supra note 5, at 240, 245-46.
41

U.S.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES:

AN

UPDATED

ANALYSIS

(Dec.

2013),

https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf [https://perma.cc/FrK5-NN2W].
42 Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1076 (9th Cir. 2018).
4 Resale Royalty Right, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/
[https://perma.cc/4TQ7-ZMDA].
" Our use of "equity" here merely reflects the point that resale royalties essentially give artists a cut
of the upside of all of their art, which is quite similar economically to retaining (involuntarily) an equity
interest. (They pay for the interest, of course, in the form of a lower sales price.)
As we note below, Amy Whitaker has recently made the case for artists retaining more formal "equity
interests" in their art. See infra notes 249-254 and accompanying text.
4

1 LLIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETr, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 2
(John M. Kemochan ed., Louise-Martin-Valiquette trans., 1991).
4

Id. at 4-5.
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handsome profit. They demanded a resale royalty right, hoping to share in the
bounty. 47

'

The Socidt des Amis du Luxembourg ("Society of Friends of the Luxembourg"),
an artists' organization created in 1903, proposed the creation of a descendible resale
royalty right of 1-2% of the sale price of an artwork, lasting for fifty years after its
initial sale. 4 8 And, in 1909, artists formed two groups to advocate for the creation of
a resale royalty right: the Commission permanente du droit d'auteur aux artistes
("Permanent Committee on Authors' Rights for Artists") and Le Droit d'Auteur aux
artistes ("Author's Rights for Artists"). 49 In 1914, the French government first
considered a bill proposing a resale royalty right.50 And on May 20, 1920, France
created the first resale royalty right, which gave artists an inalienable and descendible
right to a percentage of the sale price of their artworks sold at public auction for the
duration of the copyright in the artwork, "on the condition that these works, such as
paintings, sculpture, or designs, are original and represent a personal creation of the
artist." 5
Gradually, some other countries began to create similar resale royalty rights,
including Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uruguay, and Italy.5 2 In 1948, the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was revised to
include an optional resale royalty right.53 The Tunis Model Law on Copyright for
54
Developing Countries of 1976 also incorporated an optional resale royalty right.
Today, more than seventy countries have created a resale royalty right," although
some are honored only in the breach. For example, some countries have created a
resale royalty right that cannot be enforced.16 Others require private enforcement of
the resale royalty right, which is often impractical or impossible. 7

47 See id. at 2-4.
4

Id. at 3.

49 Id. at 3-4.

'o Id. at 4.
' Law of May 20, 1920, Imposing on Public Sales of Artworks a Right Inuring to the Benefit of
Artists, 1920 B.L.D. 236, 20 DUv. & BOc. 539., reprintedin DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 45, at

218. Specifically, the law entitled artists to 1% of the sale price from 1,000 to 10,000 francs; 1.5% of the
sale price from 10,000 to 20,000 francs; 2% of the sale price from 20,000 to 50,000 francs; and 3% of the
sale price over 50,000 francs. Id.
52 DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 45, at 4-5.
13 See Beme Convention, supra note 16, at art. 14ter. "Ile Beme Convention was formally amended at the
1948 Bnissels revision conference to include droit de suite under then-Aticle l4bis... .[Jhe dvit de suite provision
of the Beme Convention, which is essentially identical to the original Article 14bis, is now found under Article
l4ter." U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFCE, supranote 41, at 4.
' See Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries, art. 4bis (1976).
1 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 41, at 17.
6 Frye, supra note 5, at 246 ("Some countries have created a nominal resale royalty right, but have
not enabled enforcement." (citing Anna J. Mitran, Royalties Too?: Exploring Resale Royalties for New
Media Art, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1370 (2016))).
s See id. at 246, 270.
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B. The Resale Royalty Right in the United States

"

'

While the United States has never created a resale royalty right, it has periodically
considered creating one. The Visual Artists' Residual Rights Act of 1978 proposed
a resale royalty right of 5% of the sale price of artwork sold for $1,000 or more. 8
The Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986 proposed a resale royalty right of 7%
of the difference between the purchase and sale price of an artwork if the sale price
was more than $500 and at least 140% of the purchase price.59 The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1987 proposed a resale royalty right of 7% of the difference between
the purchase and sale price of an artwork if the sale price was more than $1,000 and
at least 150% of the purchase price.' The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 directed
the Copyright Office to conduct a study of resale royalty rights, "in consultation with
the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts."6
In 1992, the Copyright Office released a report opposing the creation of resale
royalty rights, primarily on economic efficiency grounds, which took the steam out
of the campaign, but demands for a resale royalty right eventually resurfaced.62 In
2011, Congress considered and rejected yet another proposal to create a resale
royalty right, but asked the Copyright Office to revisit the question of resale
royalties.63 In 2013, the Copyright Office released another report on resale royalties,
which reversed its previous conclusions. The report recommended the creation of
both a resale royalty right and resale royalty organizations to collect and distribute
resale royalties. Among other things, the report concluded that the Copyright Act
disadvantages visual artists who typically sell original works of art rather than copies,
and that the creation of a resale royalty right could provide an incentive to create and
distribute artworks, without harming the United States art market.6
In response to the 2013 study, Congress considered the American Royalties Too
Act of 2014, with the all-too-predictable "backronym" the "ART Act," which once
again proposed the creation of a resale royalty right.65 Under the ART Act, resale
royalties would have been inalienable, so long as the artist retained the copyright in
the work, and would have been payable to resale royalty right management
organizations regulated by the Copyright Office. In addition, the failure to pay resale
royalties would have been treated as a form of copyright infringement."6 6 While the
ART Act of 2014 failed, it was reintroduced in 2018 with bipartisan support.
Nevertheless, it appears to have failed again.

' Visual Artists' Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (1978).
' Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong. § 3(d)(1)-(2) (1986).
60 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, S. 1619, 100th Cong. § 3(d)(1)-(2) (1987).
6 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. § 8(a)(1), (b)(1) (1990).

62 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROIT DE SurrE: THE ARTIST'S RESALE ROYALTY 142-43 (Dec.

1992), https://www.copyright.gov/history/droit-de suite.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QPV-9PFF].
63 See Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, S. 2000, 112th Cong. §3(b)(2)-(3) (2011).
" Frye, supra note 5, at 250-51 (footnotes omitted) (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 41).
65 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, S. 2045, 113th Cong. § 3(7), (b)(A) (2014).
" Frye, supra note 5, at 251 (footnotes omitted).
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C. The Justificationof Statutory Resale Royalty Rights
Proponents typically offer equitable justifications for resale royalty rights.1 7 They
observe that most artists do not benefit from copyright protection because they sell
unique copies rather than reproductions, and therefore are entitled to some other form
of protection. 8 And they argue that equity entitles artists to a percentage of the resale
price of their works, just like other authors share in the profits generated by their
copyrighted works.69 But as scholars have convincingly argued, the standard
equitable arguments cannot withstand scrutiny.70
The equitable claim to additional rights is unconvincing because authors choose
their market. Artists receive copyright protection on the same terms as any other
author and choose whether or not to use it. Most authors sell the copyright in their
work to publishers who hope to profit by selling reproductions in a commodity
market. By contrast, most artists sell unique copies of their work to collectors in a
scarcity market. Choosing not to use your copyright does not entitle you to additional
rights, and successful artists can profit from any demand for reproductions.
The equitable claim to a percentage of resale profits is also unconvincing because
artists are already fully compensated by the sale price of their work. Both authors
and artists sell at whatever price the market will bear, and that price reflects the risk
of failure. The art market is notoriously risky. Some works become extremely
valuable, but most become worthless. Authors and artists alike may feel cheated if
their work becomes popular and a downstream buyer collects the profit. But they
don't offer refunds when their work is unpopular and the buyer takes a loss.
Scholars have argued that resale royalty rights are actually inequitable, because
they benefit successful artists at the expense of unsuccessful artists. 7 1 If a resale
royalty right exists, the sale price of a work on the primary market should be
discounted to reflect the present value of the resale royalty right. However, while all
artists pay for the resale royalty right on the primary market, 72 only successful artists
will collect a royalty on the secondary market." Consequently, the resale royalty
74
right is effectively a tax on unsuccessful artists for the benefit of successful artists.

" See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Casefor Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 1, 3-4
(2014) (addressing the justification that resale royalties "are required to level the playing field and address
a built-in disfavoring or discrimination in our copyright law against visual artists").
6 See id. at 4-5.
69 See id.
'o See id at 9.
" See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman & Guy Rub, Resale Royalties WouldHurt EmergingArtists, ARTSY
(Aug. 8, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-resale-royalties-hurt-emergingartists [https://perma.cc/66TU-J4SS].
n Id. ('I]f resale royalties are the law, dealers will realize that buyers' willingness to pay will drop,
and they will be forced to lower prices in the primary market art market. Who loses? The sellers in the
primary market, a.k.a. practically all artists-both young and old, newcomers and the well-established,
and everyone in between." (emphasis added)).
7 Id. ("The data shows that the likely beneficiaries in the [secondary] market will be, almost
exclusively, the super-stars of the art world. The other 99% of artists will be left out in the cold.").
74

id
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In practice, the risk discount on the primary art market is so large that a resale royalty
right would probably have little effect on prices. Only a tiny fraction of works retain
any value on the secondary market.75 Collectors buying works without a proven
secondary market should pray the resale royalty right will become relevant. And the
price of works created by artists with a proven secondary market would presumably
already reflect the resale royalty right.
Resale royalty rights are actually inequitable because they misallocate resources.
Effectively, resale royalty rights are simply a tax on the secondary art market that is
redistributed to successful artists. While there is nothing wrong with taxing the
secondary art market, there is no reason to distribute the proceeds to successful
artists, who already benefit from the increase in the market price of their works. On
the contrary, equity favors redistribution to the unsuccessful artists who took the
same risks as the successful artists but reaped none of the rewards.7 1

m.

PRIVATE RESALE ROYALTY RIGHTS

Resale royalty rights are created by the government, as a kind of para-copyright
in works of art." This is both their strength and their weakness. If they are validly
enacted, they are enforceable and have the power of the government behind them.
But getting them enacted is difficult. And, even if enacted, they may not be valid if
they exceed the powers of the government enacting them.
But people can agree to many things that the government can't force on them.
Once people agree to something, the government can often enforce their agreement,
even if it couldn't enforce the outcome on its own authority. So even if the
government won't or can't create resale royalty rights, maybe people can agree to
them. Maybe people can create private resale royalty rights.
Private resale royalty rights can take many different forms and may or may not
resemble the canonical forms of the resale royalty right. The primary practical issue
with broad private resale royalty rights is their enforceability; the normative issue
turns largely on their potential injury on third parties uninvolved in the original
transaction and on impairment of overall market functioning due to increasing
78
transaction costs by requiring more investigation at time of sale.
7 See John Henry Merryman, Comment, The Wrath ofRobert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP.
L. 103, 107 (1993).
76 Frye, supra note 5, at 266-67; see also Merryman, supranote 75, at 122 ("We have seen, however,
that only the successful artists whose works have a secondary market would receive any benefit from the
droitde suite. Put another way, the money paid to artists from resales would go to those who appear to
need it least. Many of the remaining mass of serious, working artists are self-employed, lack access to
health and retirement plans and lead economically precarious lives. That suggests that if there were to be
a charge on art resale transactions it might better be collected and administered for the benefit of needy
artists. Instead of an artists' droit de suite there would be a charge on resale transactions paid into an
artists' welfare fund."). Merryman wonders whether such a tax would be constitutional under the
Intellectual Property Clause. See id. at 122 n.37. If not, surely it would be a constitutional sales tax.
7 Frye, supra note 5, at 258 ("The resale royalty right ... is essentially a form of para-copyright that
grants authors certain rights in particular copies of their works of authorship, rather than the underlying
work itself.").
71 See id. at 270.
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The first known contractual resale royalty right was created in 1904 by Andr6
Level, a Parisian art collector, when he founded La Peau de l'Ours ("The Bearskin"),
the first art investment fund.P La Peau de l'Ours bought artwork on the primary
market, typically directly from the artist, and offered the artist 20% of the profit on
their work when the fund was liquidated in 1914.80 The fund generated a modest but
respectable profit, and the artists received their due share."
Today, as one of us has explored at length, art funds are a much-discussed, but
relatively little-used investment vehicle. 82 Theoretically, art funds could help retail
investors diversify their holdings and increase the liquidity of the art market, but in
practice they are mostly just a way of separating suckers from their money. Unlike
La Peau de l'Ours, contemporary art funds typically purchase artwork on the
secondary market, and do not have any relationship with the artist, contractual or
otherwise.8 3 If artists want a contractual resale royalty right, they need to secure it
for themselves at the time of initial sale on the primary market.
Currently, the paradigmatic way for artists to pursue a private resale royalty right
is to use the "Artist's Contract," a form agreement created in 1971.' Among other
things, the Artist's Contract provides that the buyer of a work will give the artist 15%
of the profit on any future sale of the work and will require future buyers to make
the same agreement." Many artists have used the Artist's Contract, often modifying
it to suit their own needs and preferences. Some lawyers and artists have created
variations on the Artist's Contract, intended to achieve similar goals.8 6

71 See Brian L. Frye, New Art for the People: Art Funds & FinancialTechnology, 93 CHI.-KENT L.

REV. 113, 116-18 (2018).
0 Id. at 117-19.
8 See id. at 119-20.
* See generally id. (discussing how art funds can be a form of an investment vehicle).
83 See id. at 123.

See generallyARTIST'S CONTRACT, supranote 6 (providing a form contract intended to give artists
a way to ensure certain moral rights including resale royalty rights).
8 Id. at 2-3.
84

* See generally MARIA EICHHORN, THE ARTIST'S CONTRACT (Gerti Fietzek ed., 2009) (featuring a

series of interviews with individuals who have either used the Artist's Contract or come up with their own
form of the contract to suit their needs).
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In a crowded gallery, in front of stunned guards, Takis moved in on
his own work, cut the wires, unplugged it, and, protected by Farman and
Willoughby, gently carried it out into the museum garden, with a coolness
that was unbelievable. It was very well rehearsed and on the surface
looked more like a movie jewel-robbery than the anarchist's ballet that it
really was. Takis and his bearded cadre left a small wake of handbills,
strategically handed out to the guards as they approached, and to the few
bystanders that seemed to get what was going on. 92
According to Takis, "I am guarding my work. I want written assurance that this
will be permanently removed from this show and that the museum will not ever again
93
exhibit it without my permission."
One of the handbills distributed by Takis objected to the following:
1. The exhibition of works by living artists against their express
consent.
2. The degree of control exercised by museums, galleries and private
collectors over the work of living artists.
3. The lack of consultation between museum authorities and artists,
particularly with regard to the maintenance and installation of their works.
4. The unauthorized use of photographs and other material for
publicity purposes.94
After Takis and his friends staged a ninety-minute protest in the MoMA sculpture
garden, MoMA Director Bates Lowry met with them for two hours.95 Eventually, he
agreed to remove Tele-Sculpture from the show and to continue the conversation on
January 24, 1969.96
B. The Art Workers Coalition
Takis's protest inspired the formation of a group of artists who objected to the
social norms of the art world.97 MoMA remained the focal point of their opposition,
the foil in their attempt to reconstitute governing art world norms. Within a couple
of weeks, their objections included the lack of a resale royalty right:
6) A plan should be evolved to provide the artist with some percentage
of the resale price of his work, whether this goes up or down. At present
artists, unlike writers or composers, receive money only from the first sale
92 Perreault, supra note 90, at 2.
93 id

9 Statement, Takis Vassilakis (Jan. 5,1969), repintedin ART WORKERS' COALION, DOCUMENTS 15 (1969).
9 Perreault, supra note 90, at 2.
9 Memorandum from Bates Lowry to the Staff of the Museum of Modem Art (Mar. 18, 1969),
reprinted in ART WORKERS' COALMON, DOCUMENTS 1 33, 33-34 (1969) [hereinafter Bates Lowry
Memo 1]; see also Press Release, Artists Protest Against Museum of Modem Art (Mar. 14, 1969),
reprinted in ART WORKERS' COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 31, 31.
9 Initially, the group of artists included Gregory Battcock, Hans Haacke, Tom Lloyd, Willoughby
Sharp, Takis Vassilakis, Wen-Ying Tsai, and John Perreault. Bates Lowry Memo 1, supra note 96, at 34.
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of their work, and the effect of any later sale is felt only by the subsequent
owners. This is particularly important for the majority of artists who only
sell a few works and who can never hope to sell a work to a major
museum, with the attendant publicity and price increase this could bring
to all their work."
The artists wanted twelve people to participate in a negotiation. 99 Lowry
t
But on January
proposed six artists and six MoMA staffers, and the artists agreed.'"
0
24, ten artists and critics showed up at MoMA.' Lowry refused to meet with them
but agreed to meet with a smaller group of artists on January 28.102
A few days later, a group of artists presented Lowry with a list of "13 Demands,"
including a demand that MoMA take a position on resale royalties: "8. The Museum
should declare its position on copyright legislation and the proposed arts proceeds
act."10 3
Lowry ultimately responded by proposing the creation of a "Special Committee
on Artist Relations" to consider the demands, in consultation with the artistic
community." But the artists rejected his proposal because it did not provide for an
immediate "public hearing" and it failed to address their other demands. They
requested a response by March 7.Vos Among other things, they wanted more
money: "Artists are tired of being exploited. There are very few artists who make a
06
living out of their art."
07
MOMA
Soon afterward, the artists began threatening another protest.1
08
But the artists
announced the creation of a Special Committee on Artist Relations.
were not mollified. They issued a press release, stating that MoMA's response to
their demands was unacceptable and that they would "resort to whatever action they
deem necessary.""9

98 Alex Gross, Artists Attack MoMA, THE EAST VLLAGE OTHER, Jan. 24, 1969, reprinted in ART
WORKERS' COALITION, DoCuMENTS 1 9, 10 (1969).
9 Bates Lowry Memo 1, supra note 96, at 33.
100 Id.
'01 Press Release, supra note 96, at 31.
102 Id.; see also Bates Lowry Memo 1, supra note 96, at 34.
103 13 Demands (Jan. 28, 1969), reprinted in ART WORKERS' COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 13, 13
(1969); see also Press Release, supra note 96, at 31.
04
' Letter from Bates Lowry, Director, the Museum of Modern Art, to Art Workers' Coalition (Feb. 14, 1969),
reprintedin ART WORKERS' COALmON, DocuMENTS 118, 18 (1969) [hereinafter Bates Lowry Letter].
10 Letter from Art Workers' Coalition to Bates Lowry, Director, the Museum of Modern Art (Feb. 22,1969),
reprintedin ART WORKERS' COALION, DOCUMENTS 122,22 (1969) [hereinafter A.W.C. Letter].
" John Perreault, Outside the Museum, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 6, 1969, reprinted in ART
WORKERS' COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 23, 23 (1969).
1o7 Grace Glueck, Artists Threaten Sit-in at the Modern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1969, at 26; Innis
MacBeath, Artists May Hold Museum Sit-In, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1969, reprinted in ART WORKERS'
COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 27, 27 (1969); see also Letter from Art Workers' Coalition to Bates Lowry,
Director, the Museum of Modem Art (Mar. 10, 1969), reprinted in ART WORKERS' COALITION,

DOCUMENTS 1 28, 28 (1969).
1os MacBeath, supra note 107, at 27.
1" Press Release, supra note 96, at 32.
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used the gate, but some attempted to march into the museum through the back
door."' The protestors addressed the crowd through a portable bullhorn, and then
left through the lobby."'9 The protest was organized by the "Art Workers Coalition
Committee for the Black Bloc," 20 and many of the speakers demanded more
minority representation in the MoMA collection, among other things.121
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120 Windeler, supra note
117.
121 Alex Gross, Black Art-Tech Art-PrickArt, THE EAST VILLAGE OTHER, Apr. 2, 1969, reprinted
in
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Some Points bearing on the relationship of works of art to museums
and collectors:
1. A work of art by a living artist would still be the property of the
artist. The collector would, in a sense, be the custodian of that art.
2. The artist would be consulted when his work is displayed,
reproduced or used in any way.
3. The museum, collector or publication would compensate the artist
for use of his art. This is a rental, beyond the original purchase price. The
rental could be nominal; the principle of a royalty would be used.
4. An artist would have the right to retrieve his work from a collection
if he compensates the purchaser with the original price or a mutually
agreeable substitute.
5. When a work is resold from one collector to another, the artist
would be compensated with a percentage of the price.
6. An artist should have the right to change or destroy any work of his
as long as he lives. 127
Seth Siegelaub suggested that artists should think carefully about what they want,
and use their art as leverage in order to get it:
I wish to speak extemporaneously about my feelings about what's
going on here today, and what's been going on in the last few weeks.
There seems to be a community of artists working throughout the world.
There's a whole social fabric that rests very, very precariously on
something we know as an art object, and art itself I think if one wanted
to describe this manifestation graphically, you would say that an art object
would be a rock in a pool and at various functionary levels going out from
this rock would be dealers, critics, the museums, the mass media, a whole
fabric or system, all barricading that little object. Well, it would seem that
anyone who's interested as I am in my work to try and change the
machinery or the context in which the art has been made and is being seen,
would see that the greatest asset that artists have is their art. It would seem
that for a social protest or any other type of action in withdrawing your
work or setting tight controls over it, you could achieve the goals that are
being sought... . It would seem that all this has to do, in a certain sense,
with the context in which art is being seen, and the rights which the artist
has in having it seen in the proper fashion. And it would seem that the art
is the one thing that you have and the artist always has and which picks
you out from anyone else. There's a class of human beings who make art
and a class who don't, some of whom happen to be curators of museums,
directors or museum trustees. This is the way your leverage lies. I would
think that by using that leverage you could achieve much greater goals
than in any other ways. It's the one seemingly unique aspect of an artist,
that he makes art and no-one else does.128
7 Sol LeWitt, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS' COALMON, supra note 126,
at 54; see also Glueck, supra note 125 (observing that film editor Bill Gordy suggested "artists should sell

their work on a royalty basis, insisting on contracts that would guarantee a percentage of the profits from
later resales"). Many of LeWitt's points made it into the Artist's Contract as promulgated.
128 Seth Siegelaub, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS' COALITION, supra note
126, at 59-60.
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Bill Gordy argued that artists could use contract law to create a resale royalty
right:
The real enemies of the artist are indifference to his work and lack of
money. Let's talk about money. It would be nice if this group could agree,
but even if it can't, there's a good deal that artists can do to help
themselves financially, without new legislation, on an individual basis.
The existing law of contracts allows you to sell your work with the
provision that you will receive a percentage of the profit gained from any
later resales, a kind of commission. Perhaps the knowledge that he would

benefit from any later increases in value of his work would take some of
the pressure off an artist to start at the top, to become a superstar
overnight. The art speculator is looked down on now, but let's encourage
him. His trading is the only mechanism that can drive art prices up. Let
speculation thrive, as long as the artist gets his cut.
Legally, artists together and separately, should uphold the principle
that an artist continues to own the rights to his work the way an author
owns a literary property. The painting or sculpture is like a manuscript;
the owner can keep it, or show it to his friends, but the artist continues to
hold the rights of reproduction, including the right to collect royalties if
he wants them....
Many rights can be had just by taking them, without asking museums,
galleries, or anybody else. Artists don't have to beg for everything, even
though it sometimes seems so. Let's all stop begging, even when it
pretends to be "demanding." At the appropriate time, I would like to see
someone move that a committee be formed, with legal advice, to draft a
model sales contract that secures the maximum possible control for the
artist over his work. Individuals can then, if they want to, agree to sell or
give up certain rights, but let's start out, from now on, in the position of
landlords, rather than tenants. You can have artists without museums; you
129
can't have museums without artists.

And Alex Gross argued that the AWC should create a form contract for artists to
use when selling works, as well as norms governing the purchase of works by

museums:
So much has been said about the ideology of A.W.C. and about the
contrast between reforming the Museums on the one hand and setting up
an alternate structure to them on the other, that I wonder if an important
point has not been missed.

. .

. I am speaking about the actual return an

artist can expect when he sells a work of art. The museums may or may
not be eventually reformed or an alternate structure may or may not
eventually be set up, and certainly both are desirable, but what about the
artist here and now when he sells a work of art?

129

Bill Gordy, Statenent at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS' COALmION, supra note 126, at 97-98.
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As things now stand, he will receive the selling price and that is the
end of it. But if the buyer one day resells the work of art, it is this buyer
alone who may profit from any increase in price. I believe this is
grotesquely unfair to the artist . . .. Extreme cases where the artist is living
in penury while his pictures fetch outrageous prices may be an exception,
but they are by no means unknown. In any case an artist can be said to
possess some sort of proprietary interest in his work even after he has sold
it. I believe the A.W.C. must give further currency to this notion and also
help the artist to obtain a fairer return for his work by instituting a form
which I shall refer to, for the sake of simplicity, as an A.W.C. sheet I
believe this sheet has a great role to play in the future of dealings in the
art world and may serve to perpetuate the name of the A.W.C. long after
the group itself has ceased to exist.
As I see it, the A.W.C. sheet will consist of a form listing the name of
the artist, the work of art (if it has a name), a description or reproduction
of this, and, most important, the name of the purchaser and the price he
has paid for the work of art. At the bottom of the A.W.C. sheet will be a
statement that the buyer guarantees to pay the artist a certain percentage
of the profit he may make if he ever decides to resell the work of art. This
statement the buyer will be required to read and sign. The percentage
could vary between 10 and 33% and should perhaps be decided at future
meetings of the A.W.C. or perhaps be left open for the artists and the
purchaser to decide among themselves.
Large quantities of these sheets should be printed up and the word
should be spread among artists that this sheet is to serve as the standard
form or at least as a model for all sales of all works of art. Obviously the
force of the A.W.C. Sheet will be partly symbolic and honorary at first,
and it may be difficult for artists in all cases to determine if their works of
art may not have been secretly or accidentally resold in distant parts of the
country or the world. In the absence of a central agency handling and
checking up on all works of art covered by A.W.C. Sheets, it will also be
difficult to be certain that the regulations I have described have been
carried out in all cases. In this connection I am somewhat hopeful that the
mere existence of the A.W.C. Sheet may spur into existence the body
necessary to enforce its provisions, and that this body will perhaps
comprise the nucleus of something resembling the first trade union for
artists in this country....
What I have described also has a second part. I have spoken of the
duty of the buyer to share his profits with the artist when reselling the
work of art, but there is also another factor. By far the largest and most
important buyers of works of art are our museums. There is absolutely no
reason why the museums should not agree to strengthen the A.W.C.
principle here and now by promising to pay a percentage of the price for
any work created by a living artist to the artist himself. ...
If the museums were to disagree and refuse to adopt it, then it would
seem fair to me that artists all over the country should repossess their work
from museums all over the country or engage in such demonstrations, sit-
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ins, or other acts as seem likely in each individual case to bring the
museum in question to its senses. What is being proposed is scarcely a
radical principle-it would merely reinforce what is already a relatively
popular notion, that a creator should have some sort of proprietary right
in his work even after he has sold it-this is almost a principle of common
law.... Popular feeling will very probably run highly in favor of the artists
if they make this a principle plank of their platform. The direction is
forward, and the time to take steps in that direction is now.13 0
These comments provide an illuminating bridge between the legal technology
chosen-the form contract to be used by like-minded individuals selling their
works-and the intended goal, widescale social change.
The AWC's summary of the hearing observed that several speakers had called
for the creation of a resale royalty right:
5. Several artists made a point of the fact that once a work leaves an
artist's hands, it is no longer in his control. Several people suggested that
the law of France respecting the re-sale of art be enacted in the United
States. This would result in no work being resold in the artist's lifetime
without his permission, and a proportion of accrued profit on all
subsequent sales would go to the artist. It was also urged that no work by
an artist could be shown or photographed without his permission and that
certain fees should be paid for all instances of the exhibition of a work of
art. Various practical schedules of rates and uniform contracts were
outlined in the testimony. 13 1
Accordingly, the AWC's strategic plan called for the creation of "model
contracts" for the exhibition and sale of works of art, as well as the redistribution of
resources to unsuccessful artists:
1. Rentals. All exhibitions charging entry fees should pay the
exhibiting artists rental fees for their work. This would apply to all work
whether or not owned by the artist. A model contract should be drafted.
Filmmakers should likewise be properly compensated not only for
individual screenings but also for prints acquired for museum archives.
2. Resales. A percentage of the profit realised on resale of an artist's
work should revert to the artist. A model sale contract should be drafted.
3. Ownership. The artist never gives up ownership in his work.
Reproduction and royalty rights and the right to retrieve his work for the
original price and change or destroy it would also be provided for.

13

Alex Gross, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS' COALITION, supra note 126,

at 109-13.
131 Synthetic Report of the Public Hearing Held April 10, 1969, reprinted in ART WORKERS'
COALITION, DOCuMENTS 1 102, 108 (1969).
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4. Social benefits. Research should be undertaken regarding the
Scandinavian methods of giving support to artists, the possibility of
creating a trust fund from contributions by successful artists, or from taxes
levied on sales of "dead" art; such a fund would provide stipends, sickness
benefits, help for dependents, etc. the possibility of obtaining guaranteed
annual minimum wage or negative income tax for artists.' 32

'

Again, the use of model contracts is linked to much broader set of altered social
norms and structures. Apparently, the AWC itself planned to create a "standard form
agreement" for artists, but it is unclear whether it ever actually drafted an
agreement."' In any case, the AWC continued to see the creation of resale royalties
1
as part of its mission. In November 1970, it published a "Statement of Demands."
Among other things, it claimed that artists are entitled to an ongoing ownership
interest in their work, including a resale royalty right:
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A MINIMUM INCOME IS
GUARANTEED FOR ALL PEOPLE, THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF
ARTISTS SHOULD BE IMPROVED IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
1. Rental fees should be paid to artists or their heirs for all work
exhibited where admissions are charged, whether or not the work is owned
by the artist.
2. A percentage of the profit realized on the re-sale of an artist's work
should revert to the artist or his heirs.
3. A trust fund should be set up from a tax levied on the sales of the
work of dead artists. This fund would provide stipends, health insurance,
35
help for artists' dependents, and other social benefits.1
Notably, the AWC's demands contemplated both a resale royalty right and a
3
While many have proposed the
redistributive tax on the sale of certain artworks.'

132 Legal and Economic Reforms, in ART WoRKERs' COALITION, DOCUMENTS 1 111, 113 (setting
forth the strategic plan of the A.W.C.); see also Rosemarie Castoro, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing,
in ART WORKERS, COALITION, supra note 126, at 15 (advocating for the creation of a "trust fund" for
artists funded by resale royalties); Hans Haacke, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS'
COALITION, supra note 126, at 47 (proposing that the museum sell its old art works and buy new art);
David Lee, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS' COALITION, supra note 126, at 40,42
(proposing art rentals); lain Whitecross, Statement at A.W.C. Open Hearing, in ART WORKERS'
COALITION, supra note 126, at 76 (suggesting that resale royalties be used to fund a trust for artists).
133 See van Haaften-Schick, supra note 10.
134 Adrienne Skye Roberts, The Economic Position ofArtists Should Be Improved in the Following

Ways, OPEN SPACE (Nov. 2, 2011) (reproducing Art Workers Coalition, Statement of Demands (1970)),
https://openspace.sfmoma.org/201 1/1 1/the-economic-position-of-artists-should-be-improved-in-the-

following-ways/ [https://perma.cc/G6GK-2UVL].
135 id.
136 id.

2018-2019

ART IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATION

571

creation of a resale royalty right, few have proposed taxation and redistribution of
the proceeds from the sale of artwork. 7
The AWC also made both economic and non-economic demands. The AWC not
only wanted artists to profit from increases in the value of their works, but also to
maintain control over their works after selling them.' In fact, the AWC's framing
of its demands suggests that control was more important than profit.3 9
Of course, the AWC's "demands" were really just "wishes." The AWC knew
what it wanted; but had no coherent plan for how to get it. We see, in these early
discussions, the artists and their allies trying on a number of different approaches.
They emphasize the legal rights of French artists; they seek to evoke the rhetoric and
practices of the labor movement; they claim support among the wider populace; they
look for points of leverage wherever they can-with the moment of sale being the
most promising. Their aims include initiating particular claims for particular rights,
but more importantly, capitalizing on what they perceived to be broader momentum
for social change. The economic and legal tools mentioned are to be deployed in
service of a broader reworking of the "social fabric" of the art world.
Of course, as with the demands of most would-be revolutionaries, most of
AWC's demands proved unrealistic. Particularly so with respect to royalties on
future art sales, rent-payment, and other restrictions on exhibition. While museums,
galleries, and collectors could have voluntarily chosen to pay resale royalties and
rental fees, they had no legal obligation to do so, nor did popular support materialize
to force institutions to pursue such practices.140 The AWC's only practical road to
success was probably federal legislation, which it never meaningfully pursued.
Accordingly, the AWC's demands had no direct effect on the art market or the art
world more generally.14' But it did provide inspiration for others.

1'

One of us recently proposed combining the two, suggesting several different potential models for

the equitable redistribution of resale royalties. See generally Frye, supra note 5, at 269-76.
1' Roberts, supra note 134.
139 See Legal and Economic Reforms, supra note 132, at 113 (prefacing its list of economic reforms
as necessary for artists to be "free," suggesting that control over the artists' work was paramount to
profiting from their work).
'" The first sale doctrine provides that a copyright owner's exclusive distribution right in a particular
copy of a work of authorship is extinguished by the sale of that copy. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) ("[T]he
owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . ."). And the Copyright
Act explicitly provides that a copyright owner's exclusive right to public display of a work of authorship
does not extend to particular copies of the work once they are sold. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012)
("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner,
to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to
viewers present at the place where the copy is located.").
"' See, e.g., Press Release, MoMA, Art Workers Coalition: Summary of Points Raised (July 1969),
https://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/pressarchives/4307/releases/MOMA_1969_JanJune_0139.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTC7-6FPL] (responding to the demands of the AWC and indicating
that the museum does not need to change or, in some cases, that it cannot feasibly comply with the AWC's
demands).
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In 1964, Siegelaub opened Seth Siegelaub Contemporary Art in midtown
Manhattan, an art gallery that also sold oriental rugs.1 54 The gallery was not
financially successful and closed in 1966, at which point Siegelaub became an
independent curator focused on conceptual art.is5 Between 1968 and 1971, he
organized twenty-one "exhibitions" that often had no tangible existence other than a
catalogue.' 5 6

According to Siegelaub, he discussed the idea of creating contractual resale
royalties and moral rights with "over 500 artists, dealers, lawyers, collectors,
museum people, critics and other concerned people involved in the day-to-day
workings of the international art world."l 57 At a party in February 1971, Siegelaub
asked his friend Jerold Ordover, a prominent art lawyer, to help him draft an artist's
resale royalty contract."' Ordover declined because he "didn't have the time," but
Robert Projansky overheard Siegelaub's request and volunteered to help him: "I was
and something different, a little bit of a challenge, so
there and it seemed interesting
59
I said, 'Sure, I'll do it."'"
Projansky was a junior lawyer with an interest in the arts. 6 o Coincidentally, he
had served in the same Air Force reserve unit as Siegelaub in the mid-60s, but they
did not know each other at the time."' While Projansky had little experience
1 This is the Way Your Leverage Lies, supra note 144. Siegelaub's gallery was located at 16 West
56th Street. See Walter Barker, Art Work by Erwin F. Hebner Shown in New York Gallery, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, May 25, 1965, at 19.
"s EICIHIORN, supra note 86, at 45 (interview with Seth Siegelaub); HOROWITZ, supra note 151, at
94-95; see also A Conversation Between Seth Siegelaub andHans Ulrich Obrist, TRANS>, no. 6, 1999,
at 51-63 ("Art reality was sort of framed by galleries which were rich and famous, or were poor, artists
cooperatives, which were upstairs or downstairs, uptown or downtown. This type of experience, along

with that of having a gallery myself for about 18 months or so from the Fall 1964 to Spring 1966, led me
to think about other possibilities.") [hereinafter Siegelaub & Obrist Interview].
1s6 This is the Way Your Leverage Lies, supra note 144 (detailing Siegelaub's "exhibitions,
publications, and other projects").
1s7 ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supranote 6, at 1. There is no evidence to support this claim, but Siegelaub

probably did talk to a lot of different people.
' Ordover practiced law in New York City from the 1950s until his death in 2008, representing many
different artists and galleries. Press Release, Leslie Tonkonow, Merry Christmas Mr. Ordover (July 1,
2010), http://www.tonkonow.com/press ordover.html [https://perma.cc/U86Q-34YS]. Most notably,
Ordover represented the gallerist Leo Castelli and helped the artist Lawrence Weiner create a system for
registering his text-based works. Id.
t159
6 EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 231 (interview with Robert Projansky, Apr. 23, 1998).
Projansky was born on January 2,1935, and grew up in White Plains, New York. He was admitted to the

New York State Bar by the Second Judicial Department on March 16, 1966. In re Projansky, 286 A.D.2d 35 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001). He resigned from the practice of law on June 20,2001 after being disciplined for allegedly using
his attorney escrow account for the purpose oftax evasion. Id He was the founding artistic director of The Grassroots
Shakespeare Troupe in New York City, and was also a member of The Living Theatre. As You Like It--Cast,
WILAMEITE SHAKESPEARE, http/www.wllametteshakespeare.com/2009-cast/ [https//penna.cc/ZBF3-XYRU].
He currently lives in Portland, Oregon, where he continues to be involved with theater and political activism.
16' Robert Projansky described this as follows:
ME: Were you friends?
RP: Yes, he was a friend whom I knew through friends from around the art world. But coincidentally
he and I had also been in a reserve Air Force Unit at the same place and in the same unit together. He was
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When they were done, they sent it to the printer:

,

My best recollection is that when we decided to do it, when I
expressed some interest, he turned his attention from the other guy to me,
and either we went ahead and did it that same day or within a day or two.
We talked about it, we worked it out, we wrote the text, I drafted the
Contract, we did everything in one day and night. I remember we were up
most of the night during the printing and everything.' 6 6
They entitled the form contract "The Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale
Agreement"' 6' and had it printed as a poster, with the form contract on one side and
Siegelaub's essay on the other.' 8 They wanted it to be distributed as widely as
possible, and included the following notice: "Please POST, REPRODUCE, and USE
this poster freely. This poster is not to be sold."l 69 It was a labor of love-a legal tool
produced not by entrepreneurs seeking business but by social justice warriors
seeking community impact. Siegelaub observed, "We have done this for no
recompense, for just the pleasure and challenge of the problem, feeling that should
there ever be a question about artists' rights in reference to their art, the artist is more
right than anyone else."170
The School of Visual Arts paid for the initial production and distribution of the
poster.' 7 ' The entire document was also published in the April 1971 issue of Art
News, as well as Studio Internationaland Arts Canada.'72 Before long, it became
known as the "Artist's Contract."

73

'" EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 231.
167 ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 1.
168 EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 45.

'" ARTIST'S CONTRAcT, supra note 6, at 4. As an aside, the Artist's Contract is surely an original
work of authorship protected by copyright, based on the explanation and instructions, and the copyright
vested jointly in Siegelaub and Projansky. The notice resembles a Creative Commons
attribution-noncommercial license, which permits copying, distribution, and adaptation, but prohibits
commercial uses. See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
[https://perma.cc/74Z9-64EM]. While the notice does not explicitly require attribution, Siegelaub and
Projansky may have expected it The notice also prohibits the sale of the Artist's Contract. While copyright
probably empowered Siegelaub and Projansky to prohibit commercial reproduction of the Artist's
Contract, the first sale doctrine probably permitted the sale of a copy received from a third party. In any
case, this blurring of the distinction between the intangible work and tangible copy may have reflected
the artworld origins of the Artist' Contract.
170 ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 4.

171 Id.
172 id

173 van Haaften-Schick, supra note 10, at 2. The document is often called the "Projansky Contract,"
but we will refer to it as the "Artist's Contract," because it incorporates contributions from both Siegelaub
and Projansky, as well as the artists and gallery owners Siegelaub consulted. See id. (criticizing references
to the document as the "Projansky Contract").
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C. The Purpose of the Artist's Contract
The Artist's Contract begins with Siegelaub's essay, which explains that the
purpose of the contract is "to remedy some generally acknowledged inequities in the
art world, particularly artists' lack of control over the use of their work and
participation in its economics after they no longer own it."' 74 Siegelaub observes that
artists can use the contract whenever they sell, trade, or give a work to someone and
argues that the contract is justified because artists are entitled to retain both economic
and moral rights in their works. 7 s
The Artist's Contract is intended for use whenever an artist transfers ownership
of a work by any means, including sale, trade, or gift.1 76 It instructs the artist to
complete two substantively identical copies of the agreement, striking out unwanted
clauses and adding key terms like sale price.1 77 Then, the artist and the recipient
should both sign both copies, and the artist should attach a notice of the agreement
to the work itself."
According to Siegelaub, the Artist's Contract was intended to benefit both artists
and collectors by giving them the rights and benefits they actually want.1 79 It gives
artists the following contractual rights and benefits:
*
15% of any increase in the value of each work each time it is
transferred in the future.
*
a record of who owns each work at any given time.
*
the right to be notified when the work is to be exhibited, so the
artist can advise upon or .. . veto the proposed exhibition of his/her work.
*
the right to borrow the work for exhibition for 2 months every
five (5) years (at no cost to the owner).

*
*

the right to be consulted if repairs become necessary.
half of any rental income paid to the owner for the use of the

work at exhibitions, if there ever is any.
*
all reproduction rights in the work.'s0

'

Notably, the duration of those economic rights and benefits is the life of the artist
"plus the life of a surviving spouse (if any) plus 21 years," with the exception of
8
"aesthetic" rights, which expire on the death of the artist.'
The Artist's Contract also gives collectors the following rights and benefits: the
"right to receive . . . a certified history and provenance of the work," a
"non-exploitative, one-to-one relationship" with the artist, privity of contract with
the artist, "recognition that the artists maintains a moral relationship to the work,"
174 ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 1.

" Id. at 2.
76 id
177 id.
178 id.
1' See id. at 1-2.
' Id. at 2.
181 id
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and "assurance to the owner that he is using the work in harmony with the artist's
intentions."1 82
Of course, a cynic might observe that the putative rights and benefits given to the
collector are of dubious value, with the exception of the right to a certified history
and provenance of the work, which most collectors already expect to receive.' 83
While the Artist's Contract clearly benefits artists by giving them new and valuable
rights, it is unclear how it benefits collectors, or why they should voluntarily agree
to its terms-at least from an economic perspective.
From that perspective, it is difficult to imagine why collectors would agree to
anything in the Artist's Contract unless they believed the price reflected the present
value of the contractual terms. If an artist's work is in high demand, collectors might
agree to the Artist's Contract, especially if the price is below market. On the margins,
surely it is a disincentive. A rationally minded collector would prefer to buy and sell
on familiar terms and without additional restrictions.
Yet Siegelaub insisted that the Artist's Contract would not affect demand.
Among other things, he argued that the contractual resale right applied only if the
work increased in value, and the artist could always bargain with the collector over
the nominal purchase price of the work." But he acknowledged the obvious
collective action problem, the sense in which the whole project relied on widespread
rather than isolated use: "The more artists and dealers there are using it, the better
and easier it will be for everybody."i8 s The contract's success was explicitly linked
to the success of the wider social consciousness he and his comrades were at that
time seeking to inspire in the community of artists. If collectors have a choice, they
will avoid the Artist's Contract, and if galleries and artists want to make a sale, they
will avoid the Artist's Contract as well. Only acting as a group with few defectors
could artists force buyers to play ball. Ultimately, the idea was to reshape the
background norms of the art market such that artists' preferred terms would be
widely accepted. This was no small task, but the Artist's Contract was intended as a
way for individual artists to do their part, wielding private agreements written in
legal language in order to accomplish broader social goals. It is from this perspective
that Siegelaub's optimistic statements begin to make sense-he is seeking to inspire
a movement, not to describe existing reality.
Siegelaub always insisted that the Artist's Contract was intended to solve
practical problems confronting artists. It was a middle-of-the-road option in many
ways, intended to leave intact (at least initially) many of the institutions that others
found more problematic. There would still be a private market for art, looking much
like the existing one, albeit with power shifted somewhat toward the artists. As
Siegelaub observed in a 1999 interview:

Id.
.8. Professor Whitaker discusses the fact that artists have sometimes actually beenforced into the role
of "guarantor" of their work. See generally Amy Whitaker, Artist as Owner Not Guarantor:The Art
Marketfrom the Artist's Point of View, 34 J. VISUAL RESOURCES 48 (2018).
18 ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 4.
18 Id.
182
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Its intention was just to first, articulate the kind of interests existing in
a work of art, and then, to shift the relative power relationships concerning
these interests more in favor of the artist In no way was it intended to be
a radical act; it was intended to be a practical real-life, hands-on, easy touse, no-bullshit solution to a series of problems concerning artist's control
over their work; it wasn't proposing to do away with the art object, it was
just proposing a simple way that the artist could have more control over
his or her artwork once it left their studio. Period. But the broader
social-economic questions of the changing role and function of art in
society, the possibility of alter native [sic] ways of art making or the
support of the existence of the artist; all these important questions are not
addressed here. As a practical solution, the contract did not question the
limits of capitalism and its private property; it just shifted the balance of
power in favor of the artist over some aspects of a work of art once it was
sold.' 6
Siegelaub, reflecting back almost four decades after the composition of the Artist's
Contract, draws an apt distinction between this work and more radical projects he
and others imagined and pursued. For in fact, the Artist's Contract leaves much of
the existing structure of the art world and art market in place.
It is easy to imagine that the radical artists, thinkers, and critics with whom
Siegelaub was generally allied might consider the approach embodied in the Artist's
Contract to be inconsistent with their more communitarian values-a marginal
improvement at best, falling far short of the revolution that was needed. The notion
of discrete, art objects, essentially commodified, sold by individual artists for their
profit to the highest bidder for individual use (even if restricted in large part by the
Artist's Contract) might still have been widely viewed as reifying a narrow and
bourgeois conception of the artistic endeavor. 87 Of course, one could argue that it
was merely a first step, and that its success could have sparked further moves to
consolidate a renewed social consciousness in the art world and beyond; in other
words, one could defend it on tactical grounds if not strategic ones. Such are always
the debates of would-be revolutionaries.
In any case, it is worth bearing in mind that while widespread adoption of the
Artist's Contract would have represented a serious change, and while it was intended
to provide an easy practical tool to take that step, nonetheless, to many, that step
alone wouldn't have been enough.
D. The Functionof the Artist's Contract
From a narrow legal perspective, the purpose of the Artist's Contract is twofold:
to form an enforceable agreement with the desired contractual terms as between the
artists and the initial collector, and then to enforce the agreement against third parties
(i.e., subsequent buyers).
.6Siegelaub & Obrist Interview, supra note 155.
"'For some examples of more stringent critiques and alternative approaches taken by contemporaries
of Siegelaub, see Miriam Kienle, The "Exploits and Escapades" of the Robin Gallery: Ray Johnson's
Queer PublicityNetwork as Counterpublic, 42 OXFORD ART J. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
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Forming an agreement may be problematic because many collectors will resist
the terms of the Artist's Contract, but if the collector agrees, the agreement will
probably be enforceable as between her and the artist. Contract law is intentionally
flexible and accommodating. Almost any contractual term can be legally binding, so
long as the parties to the contract agree to it and it is neither illegal nor against public
policy. Accordingly, the terms of the Artist's Contract are probably enforceable
against the initial buyer of the work, who is a party to the contract.
Enforcing the agreement against third parties, however, is probably impossible.
As a practical matter, it is difficult for artists to know what a collector does with a
work."' In order to enforce a contractual resale royalty right, the artist must know
when the collector sells the work, and in order to enforce contractual moral rights,
the artist must know how the collector uses the work. But most artists cannot
realistically monitor collectors and enforce those rights.
Siegelaub argued that artists could collectively use self-help and social norms to
enforce the Artist's Contract.139 Even if compliance is hard to monitor, at least some
breaches will be discovered. If artists punish the breaches they discover, it will
discourage collectors from breaching and encourage them to honor the terms of the
Artist's Contract. The art market depends on relationships and trust, and collectors
who breach agreements will soon find themselves shut out. This reasoning is
compelling so far as it goes. Of course, as the marketplace becomes broader and
more diverse, such reputational and relational sanctions will become less effective.
If a collector does breach the Artist's Contract, it is almost certainly
unenforceable at law, against a third party, due to a lack of privity of contract and
the general legal reluctance to recognize burdens on items of personal property. The
doctrine of privity of contract provides that contracts can only impose obligations on
parties to the contract.1 90 Accordingly, when a collector buys a work from an artist
and agrees to the Artist's Contract, the collector is a party to the agreement, so privity
of contract exists. But when the collector sells the artwork to someone else, that
person is not a party to the agreement with the artist, so privity of contract does not
exist. The artist and the collector have privity of contract, and the collector and the
third party have privity of contract, but the artist and the third party do not. Similarly,
with a few narrow exceptions, property law generally doesn't recognize covenants
"running with" items of personal property.
In theory, the collector and the subsequent buyer could make the artist a
third-party beneficiary of their agreement.9' But they are under no obligation to do
so. If the buyer promises to pay the artist a resale royalty, the artist may be able to
enforce that promise in some jurisdictions.' 92 But the artist cannot force the buyer to
make the promise, nor bring a breach of contract action against a buyer who does not
188 See Gross, supra note 130, at 110-11 (discussing the difficulty of keeping track of the future
transfers of a work, even after a buyer agrees to the resale royalty).
189 See ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 4.
19o
Overview:
privity
of
contract,
OXFORD
LAW
REFERENCE,
http/www.oxfodreference.comMew/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100347633 [hftps//permaccf6CV-VKS5].
1'9

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

192 See Frye, supra note 5, at 247-48.

§ 304

cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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make the promise. At most, the artist can attempt a breach of contract action against
the collector for failing to require the buyer to make the artist a third-party
beneficiary.
The Artist's Contract purports to create privity of contract between artists and
third parties. Specifically, it requires collectors to transfer their duties to the artist
along with the work."' It prohibits collectors from selling unless the third party
agrees to assume those duties.194 Furthermore, it provides that third parties are bound
by the terms of the Artist's Contract, whether or not they agree to them.' 95
Unfortunately, none of those clauses are likely enforceable against third parties.
Artists may have breach of contract claims against collectors who sell their work
without requiring the buyer to agree to the terms of the Artist's Contract. But even if
the buyer agrees to the terms, it is a contract with the collector, not the artist. While
the artist may benefit from the new contract, the artist is still a non-party who can
enforce it at best as a third-party beneficiary.9 6
The policy reasons for the invalidity of the Artist's Contract become obvious
when it is considered in the abstract. The Artist's Contract is designed for use by
artists transferring their works to others.' 9 But nothing intrinsic to the contract limits
it to artists or their works. If the provisions of the Artist's Contract are valid, then
anyone can bargain for them. A collector could resell a work subject to the Artist's
Contract and claim the contract rights intended for artists. Anyone selling any kind
of personal property could use the Artist's Contract to ensure future control over that
property. If you can use the Artist's Contract to sell art, you can also use similar
provisions to sell a car or a wastebasket. Would-be buyers of all sorts of objects
would have to investigate in order to assure that the seller hadn't entered some side
agreement with an unknown third party who would later seek to enforce the
agreement against the buyer. This possibility represents a potentially serious
hindrance to the functioning of markets in personal property of every sort, and is at
least a large part of the reasons court don't generally enforce such encumbrances.' 9 8
The resale royalty provision of the Artist's Contract is also in tension with the
first sale doctrine, which provides that a copyright owner's exclusive distribution
right only applies to the initial sale of any particular copy of a work.1 99 Normally,
when copyright owners sell a copy of a work, the buyers own the particular copy
they purchased and can dispose of it in any way they like, so long as they do not
infringe any of the other exclusive rights of the copyright owner. 2 00 For better or
worse, courts have allowed parties to contract around the first sale doctrine in relation
to digital works because identifying a "particular copy" of a digital work is difficult,
' ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 7.
195 Id.
196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
19 ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 2.

§ 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

'9 These issues are discussed at length, convincingly, by Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Nunerus Clausus Problem andthe DivisibilityofRights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002).
"9 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (codifying the first sale doctrine).
200 see id
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if not conceptually incoherent. 201' But the Supreme Court has consistently held that
the first sale doctrine applies to the sale of tangible copies of a work of authorship,
which would certainly include most works of visual art.2 02
In addition, some of the moral rights claimed by the Artist's Contract conflict
with provisions of the Copyright Act. For example, the Artist's Contract enables the
artist to prohibit the exhibition of the work, 203 even though the sale of a copy of a
work terminates this display right.204 Likewise, the Artist's Contract claims rights of
attribution and integrity broader than those granted by VARA.
Of course, contractual agreements can and do preempt copyright defaults,
especially in bilateral contracts. 205 Courts have limited the application of the first sale
doctrine by allowing copyright owners to characterize transactions as "licenses"
rather than "sales." 206 Accordingly, courts have recognized limitations on the first
sale doctrine almost exclusively in relation to transactions involving digital property,
and have rejected efforts to restrict the transfer of physical property.207 Artwork is
typically physical property. Moreover, the Artist's Contract specifically refers to the
contemplated transfer as a "sale." 208 It is unclear whether courts would find the
Artist's Contract enforceable as written.
The Artist's Contract is designed to give artists what they want; but if wishes
were horses, beggars would ride. The law treats artists the same as anyone else, and
intentionally prohibits contractual terms like those in the Artist's Contract, even if
artists want them.
E. The Response to the Artist's Contract
The Artist's Contract immediately caught the attention of not only the
international art press,2" but also of art lawyers.21 o It was widely reprinted by both
arts organizations and legal scholars.211 And it was translated into many different
languages including French, German, Italian, Swedish, and Dutch.212
The art world's conventional wisdom, however, was rather skeptical of the
viability of the Artist's Contract:

201
202

See, e.g., Adobe Systems Inc. v. Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015).
See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 521-22, 535 (2013).

203 ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supranote 6, at 7.
204

20 5

Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 523, 537.

See generallyChristina Bohannan, CoprightPreemptionofContracts, 67 MD. L. REV. 616 (2008).

Irina D. Manta & David S. Olson, Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor You, Then They Will
DiscriminateAgainst You. Perfectly., 67 ALA. L. REV. 135, 146,164-65 (2015).
207 Compare MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1993) (enforcing
restrictions on the use of software), with Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 544-45 (invalidating restrictions on the
transfer of books).
200 ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 6 (the form contract itself, in Article One, characterizes the
transaction as a 'TURCHASE AND SALE").
209 See, e.g., Caroline Tisdall, FairerShare of the Spoils, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 23, 1971, at 8.
210 van Haaften-Schick, supranote 10, at 16-18 (discussing lawyers' reactions to the Artist's Contract).
211 Id. at 14,
21.
212 Robert Projansky, The Rights ofArtists, JURIS DOCTOR, June 1974, at 16, 16.
206

2018-2019

ART IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATION

583

The agreement was imaginative-but it had a major flaw. It depended
on the goodwill of prospective buyers (who didn't want to have their
hands tied) and of museums (which generally denounced it as
"unenforceable") and of artists (who often weren't willing to risk losing a
sale by insisting on having it signed) and of dealers (who generally like to
213
keep big purchases secret).
Even Siegelaub and Projansky
handiwork's adoption:

candidly

shared skepticism about their

Controversial from the beginning, it was viewed as unenforceable,
time-consuming and detrimental to sales-all of which proved to be true
to varying degrees. Says Mr. Projansky, "We never expected this to
become the standard of the art world, but we wanted to raise the subject
and maybe influence some legislation." 214
Lawyers and legal scholars were even more skeptical of the Artist's Contract.
2 15
Many were already opposed to mandatory resale royalties, on economic grounds.
They observed that many provisions in the Artist's Contract were unenforceable as
written, especially the contractual resale royalty, thus appearing to sink consensual
imposition of such royalties on a broad scale. 1 6
Thus while it faced considerable skepticism from some pragmatists, the project
captured the imagination of many. It drew considerable attention as a novel way of
seeking to shift market power through a different legal form than that of legislation.
As we turn to the (relatively few) known instances of its actual use, it becomes
apparent that its "meaning" on a level other than that of strict legal enforceability
was its strength.

Barbara Gold, Money Talks the LoudestforArtists Today, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 24, 1974, at D8.
214 Roberta Smith, When Artists Seek Royalties on Their Resales, N.Y. TIMES (May
31, 1987),
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/31/arts/when-artists-seek-royalties-on-their-resales.html
213

[https://perma.ccfYH4-UX53].

215 See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 75, at 119.
216 van Haaften-Schick, supra note 10, at 17-19.
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Initially, some artists wanted to use the Artist's Contract and some galleries
agreed. 219 Today, the Artist's Contract is most strongly associated with Hans Haacke,
a conceptual artist with strong ideological commitments. 220 Haacke not only insisted
on using the Artist's Contract but also insisted on enforcing it. For example, Haacke
sold his work On Social Grease(1975), a set of six photoengraved magnesium plates
mounted on aluminum featuring quotes from political and business leaders, subject
to the Artist's Contract. 221 When the work eventually went up for auction in 1987,
Haacke insisted that the auction house display the Artist's Contract along with the
work and read it aloud immediately before the sale. 222 Haacke was not alone. Other
artists, including Adrian Piper, also used the Artist's Contract. 223
Other artists used versions of the Artist's Contact for more pragmatic reasons,
primarily because they wanted to keep track of the ownership and exhibition of their
works:
The French artist Daniel Buren also uses [the Artist's Contract],
according to his dealer, John Weber (who is also Mr. Haacke's dealer)
-- but he uses it without the 15 percent resale clause, primarily to control
the exhibition and installation of his exceedingly site-specific work. And
both Edward Kienholz and Carl Andre have been known to use similar
contracts intermittently. 224

Some artists used the Artist's Contract briefly, then stopped. For example, the
sculptor Jackie Winsor sold fifteen works pursuant to the Artist's Contract in the
1970s but stopped using it as her work became more popular and prices increased.225
Her use of the Artist's Contract was justified as follows:
In the beginning especially, when she was selling her sculptures for
almost less than it cost to make them, Ms. Winsor seems to have used the
contract as a device to establish, in her words, "my sense of their own
value" and as a way "to get people not to be stupid with them," and it
usually worked.22 6
Although Winsor realized she couldn't command high market prices at that point in
her career, she felt that the legal document itself-fully enforceable or
not-somehow affected her relationship to collectors, and even to herself. This is a
classic example of the shaping of legal consciousness, that is, the way that legal
language and devices interact with--change and are changed by-the social context
surrounding their use. Legal language and legal devices shape conceptions of self
219

Id. at 41.

220 Smith, supra note 214.
221
22 2

id
d

22

EICHHORN, supra note 86, at 41 (stating that Carl Andre and Sol LeWitt used the Artist's Contract); van
Haaften-Schick, supra note 10, at 17 (discussing Adrian Piper and Jackie Winsor's use of the Artist's Contract).
224 Smith, supra 214.
2 25

226

id.
id
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and society held by those deploying and interacting with them.227 This is true even if
there is no likelihood, or intention, of enforcement of legal rights through the formal
legal system.
Many artists found that the Artist's Contract simply wasn't worth the trouble.
Some collectors resisted it, and no one liked the red tape:
Ms. Winsor and her dealer, Paula Cooper, admit, as does Mr. Haacke,
that some sales were lost because of their insistence on using the contract.
They also recall-despite the apparent simplicity of Siegelaub-Projansky
form-the endless amounts of paperwork and negotiating time that went
into each sale, factors that made its use impractical. Thus, by the late
1970's, the artist's contract was, with few exceptions, out of sight and out
of mind in New York

. . . .228

Absent the terms of the contract gaining widespread social acceptance, only a
subset of artists could actually insist on using the Artist's Contract anyway, primarily
the most successful ones. 229 If an artist's work was in high demand, then collectors
would swallow their objections, especially if the price was right. But if demand
slipped, then collectors had plenty of other options.
Ironically, other artists used the Artist's Contract because their customers were
insufficiently sophisticated about the art market to object. For instance, the Boston
Visual Artists Union used a version of the Artist's Contract for all of its sales for a
time:
In the six months the BVAU has been using this rather quietly worded
contract, it has received almost universal acceptance by the art buyers.
(There has been some controversy over binding heirs to the contract and
establishing the rights of the artist to "show" the work.) But as Kyra
Montagu of the BVAU notes, "Most of the people who come into our
gallery store are not serious investors. They are buying for themselves,
untinged by commercial considerations and are pretty happy to sign." 230
As a practical matter the BVAU contract was irrelevant, because none of the
work appears to have had any meaningful value on the secondary market. The
contract may have even increased sales by encouraging naive consumers to assume
that the work would increase in value, rather than immediately become worthless.
This is another expressive purpose potentially served by the contract, although
apparently one unintended by Siegelaub and Projansky.
Some artists objected to the Artist's Contract. Some thought it was just unrealistic
red tape:

227 See, e.g., EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 11, at 50 (noting the "mutually constitutive" nature of
various social structures, including that of "legality").
228 Smith, supra 214.
229 van Haaften-Schick, supra note 10, at 16-17.
230 Ellen Goodman, Artists Can't Eat Canvas, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1975, at 27.
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Like many other artists, Mel Bochner ... remembers being opposed
to the contract-even though he "liked the idea of trying to protect artists'
rights"-primarily because it seemed unenforceable. "The last thing I was
interested in," said Mr. Bochner, "was the formation of more bureaucracy,
of another kind of art police. Also, I didn't want to be the custodian of my
own past." Mr. Bochner also voiced his suspicion of the idea that
"everything was going to increase in value forever," and, giving the
argument a little twist, said he felt that if artists wanted to share in the
profits, they should be prepared to pay the collector a percentage of any
23
decline in value if the work sold for less than its original price. 1
Others objected to the Artist's Contract on ideological grounds. For instance,
some thought it cheapened art by further commodifying it.232 Others thought it was
inequitable, because it only benefited successful artists and did nothing for
unsuccessful artists. For example, the National Art Workers Community argued that
the Artist's Contract should have provided that a percentage of the contractual resale
royalties be paid into a pension fund for artists in order to provide a benefit to all
artists. 233
G. The Aftermath of the Artist's Contract
The heyday of the Artist's Contract was short-lived, at least in part because its
chief champion quickly departed the battlefield. In 1972, shortly after publishing the
Artist's Contract, Siegelaub abruptly quit the art world and moved to Paris to pursue
other interests, including Marxist media theory and the history of handwoven
textiles. 23 4
Projansky parlayed his role in drafting the Artist's Contract into a successful law
practice representing artists. In 1974, he revised the Artist's Contract, making it
shorter and easier to understand:
I recently decided that my supposed cleverness notwithstanding, the
contract was so carefully drawn-to maintain a chain of privity, for
example-that only a lawyer could appreciate it (or, some have said, even
read it). So I have written a second edition, soon to be published and, I
23
232 E.g., Smith, supra note 214.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER ALBERRO, CONCEPTUAL ART AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLICITY 169 (2003).
233 van Haaften-Schick, supra note 10, at 17.
234 The Stuff That Matters. Textiles collected by Seth Siegelaub for the CSROT, RAVEN Row,
http://www.ravenrow.org/exhibitio/thestuff thatmatters/ [https://perma.cc/2K58-26K9].
Initially,
Siegelaub started a publishing company focused on Marxist media theory. van Haaften-Schick, supranote
10, at 54 n.101. In 1986, he founded the Center for Social Research on Old Textiles, and eventually
published an extensive bibliography of historical textiles, Bibliographica Textilia Historise in 1997. The
Stuff That Matters, supra; see also Siegelaub & Obrist Interview, supra note 155, at 51-63 ("I cannot
speak for anybody but myself, but I do find it to be a very serious problem in one's life to be interested in
something and really approach it in a critical new way, which I have always tried to do, whether with
political publishing, left media research or textile history. I am currently working on a bibliography of
textile history, and I have asked myself many times why this project has not been done by a museum many
years ago.").
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hope, distributed throughout the country. Amazingly, I found that it was
possible to reduce the gross wordage by about 60 percent and still say the
same things just as effectively-and make the contract itself more
effective in terms of the artist getting people to sign it. Now few buyers
will feel the need to show it to counsel first.23 5
The revised contract was published in the July 1975 issue of the Art Workers
News.23 6 While it was indeed slightly shorter and easier to understand, it inevitably
failed to solve the fatal enforceability problems that faced the original Artist's
Contract. 237 Charles Jurrist, another art lawyer, also published a model artist's
contract in the same issue of Art Workers News. 238 Jurrist's model contract was
similar to the Artist's Contract, but limited it to the initial resale, 239 the only one it
could effectively bind.
Another approach, by artist June Wayne, looked to a different approach entirely,
proposing a central registry:
Forget laws and contracts both, urges June Wayne, preferring instead
a registry and escrow service for artists set up by a title company, bank,
insurance company or govermnent agency such as the patent office. When
the artist sells a work, explains Wayne, the artist and buyer would agree
on terms for residual rights and record them with the title company along
with the first transfer of title from the painter to the new owner. On future
sales, the purchaser would have to search the title and pay the artist's share
to the title company; the latter would then forward the money on to the
artist before transferring title.24 0
Such a system, akin to the car titling system or the real estate recordation system in
place in many localities in the United States, was never adopted for art. 241 The
imposition of a centralized, inevitably complicated, bureaucratic system, might be
effective at protecting the rights in question. But even if successful as a legal matter,
such a project seems somehow limiting. Notably, it would be less empowering of
artists themselves and less likely to usher in broader social changes in the art world,
simply displacing their power and control to a distant bureaucracy. It lacks the
61an-the upstart, grassroots vitality-of the Artist's Contract as originally
conceived. It could win the battle, by giving some successful artists some greater
profits from their art, but lose the war if it failed to reshape the "legal consciousness"

235 Robert Projansky, The Rights ofArtists, JuRIs DocToR, June 1974, at 16. These comments suggest
that it is not clear that the Artist Contract's original author understood either the primary virtues, or
limitations,
of his handiwork.
236
Nonnan Nadel, Atist Demand ShareofResale Profa, EL PASO HERALD-PosT, Mar. 15, 1975, at 39.
237
See Robert Projansky, The Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer andSale Agreement: Second Edition,
ART WORKERS NEWS, July 1975.

23' Nadel, supra note 236.
239 van Haaften-Schick, supra note 10,
at 19.
24 Barbara Isenberg, Portraitofthe Artist as aFinancialDisaster,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1975, at 588.
241 See infra note 253 and accompanying text for some citations and discussions of subsequent
proposals along these lines.
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of those participating in the art market and thus to bring wider scale empowerment
and reform.

2 42

And that was that. For a few years in the early 1970s, the Artist's Contract was
the talk of the town, and then it was forgotten-until recently.
H. The Resurrectionof the Artist's Contract
In 2015, the Essex Street Gallery on the Lower East Side of Manhattan presented
a group show titled "The Contract," devoted to the Artist's Contract.2 43 The show
included historical works by Hans Haacke and Maria Eichhorn, as well as new works
by Cameron Rowland, Wade Guyton, R.H. Quaytman, and others. 24 All of the
works in the show were offered for sale on the condition that the buyer agree to the
terms of the Artist's Contract, and most of them sold. 2 45
The Essex Street Gallery show sparked new interest in the Artist's Contract.
Eichhorn published a collection of interviews with people involved in the creation
or use of the Artist's Contract. 2 46 And several artists have picked up on the idea to
propose 21st century versions of the Artist's Contract.
For example, Alex Strada drafted a contract intended for use when selling her
own work.2 47 In many respects, her contract is similar to the Artist's Contract, but it
provides that the collector must promise to sell the work in ten years and use the
"accrued value" to purchase a work by an emerging female artist, in consultation
with Strada. 24 8 It is unclear whether she has sold any work pursuant to this contract.
By contrast, Amy Whitaker argues that artists can use blockchain to create
enforceable private resale royalty rights: "By registering artworks with blockchain
to establish authenticity and create property rights which can then be split off and
traded, artists can retain an 'equity share' in the works, much like the founder of a
249
startup retains an ownership stake that grows in value as the company expands."

242 Cf van Haaften-Schick, supranote 10, at 23-24 ("[W]ere laws to pass that addressed all provisions
in the Agreement, would it have fully succeeded by writing itself out of necessity (dematerializing

perhaps), and fulfilling the aim of concretely influencing social politics? Or, might we be better off
preserving the Agreement as a device of private law to be leveraged by artists, so that they may be the
ones to reform and reauthor art
industry norms?").
243 Kibum Kim, Could a Long-Forgotten Contract Settle the Artist Resale Royalties Debate?,
HYPERALLERGIC (Jan. 5,2015), https://hyperallergic.com/172688/could-a-long-forgotten-contract-settlethe-resale-royalties-debate/ [https://perma.cc/PB9A-L6N9].
244 ld
245

id

246 See EICHHORN, supra note 86.
247 Isaac Kaplan, Alex Strada Is ContractuallyBinding Her Collectors to

Support EmergingFemale
Artists, ARTSY (Nov. 1, 2017, 7:16 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-alex-stradacontractually-binding-collectors-support-emerging-female-artists [https://perma.cc/55V5-QFZ8].
248
Artist Contract 2017, ALEX STRADA, http://www.alexstrada.com/index.html#contract
[https://perma.cc/U859-6VZ4]; see also Kaplan, supra note 247.
249 Anna Louie Sussman, Could Blockchain Put Money Back in Artists'Hands?, ARTSY (Mar.
16, 2017, 7:58 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-blockchain-money-artistshands [https://perma.cc/44M6-E7M4]; see also Whitaker, supra note 183, at 52-53.
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Under Whitaker's proposal, artists selling work would "retain an equity stake in their
work" and use blockchain to track it.250

Part of this proposal seems to be merely the familiar call for a centralized registry,
clothed in trendy technological language. Of course, "blockchain" was the buzzword
of 2017, and by now has become a running joke in many circles. 251' According to
Whitaker, "[b]lockchain could provide an elegant private-sector solution that lets
artists easily track an artwork and its traded price as it passes through the hands of
collectors and institutions, bringing much-needed transparency to a market long on
information asymmetry and opacity."25 2 Perhaps. But is tracking the ownership of
and transactions in a work of art really the intractable part of this problem? It is
unclear what blockchain adds to the mix. It is one thing to suggest the use of
blockchain to authenticate inherently intangible and fungible digital assets. It is
another to use it to authenticate physical objects. If the art market were to demand
an online, centralized database run by a trusted intermediary, such a system would
seem easier to introduce and more reliable than the cumbersome-and, judging by
news stories, still quite risky-mechanisms offered by the blockchain. Proposals for
centralized art registries have kicked around for a long time,253 and they seem to have
failed more because of lack of political will than need for better recordkeeping
technologies. Surely traditional methods are more than adequate, to the extent that
parties actually consider reliable authentication and provenance an asset, rather than
a liability. 254
All that said, Whitaker offers interesting insights concerning artists retaining an
"equity" interest in their work. Her work can be seen as an attempt to catalyze a new
understanding of artists and their relationship with those who trade in their art. Her
writings interestingly deploy legal and financial concepts to try to reshape the social
and economic world of artists, much as Siegelaub and Projansky's project did.2 55
Thus, practical objections to a blockchain-based registry proposal resemble legal
objections to the enforceability of the Artist's Contract, in that they miss the broader
250 Sussman, supra note 249; see also Whitaker, supra note 183 (presenting this idea at greater length).

25' See, e.g., Matt Levine, You Have to Threaten People Right, BLOoMBERG: MONEY STUFF

(Mar. 26, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-26/you-have-tothreaten-people-right ("Obviously I am quoting this mainly because it contains the words 'blockchain
blockchain blockchain,' which has long been my dumb shorthand version of how blockchain projects are
pitched to big banks. Apparently it is more or less accurate!").
252 Sussman, supra note 248; see also Whitaker, supra note 182.
253 See, e.g., Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit De Suite and a Proposed
Enactmentfor the UnitedStates, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 19 (1966) (discussing a system including a centralized
registry for implementing resale royalties in the United States); Isenberg, supranote 240. Most successful
registries appear to have been conceived and implemented to deal with art theft or looting. See, e.g., Steven
A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitationsfor Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437 (1994)
(arguing for changes in the law in light of the implementation of lost art registries); Provenance in the
World War II Era, 1933-1945: Lost Art Databases & Resources, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION,
https://provenance.si.edu/jsp/lostart databases.aspx [https://perma.cclW7M4-AB6R] (listing registries).
254 Indeed, art market participants tend to avoid transparency and prefer secrecy. See Frye, supra note

79, at 133.
2

SS Whitaker, supra note 183; Amy Whitaker, Ownershipfor Artists, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF ARTISTIC
PROPERTY 70 (2014), http://thesociallifeofartisticproperty.com/material/sociallifeofartisticproperty.pdf

[https://perma.cc/MP6M-46EF].
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point. Ultimately, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that the highest and
best purpose of the Artist's Contract was to begin a conversation about what rights
artists wanted and why they were entitled to those rights.256 Even if the Artist's
Contract was impractical and unenforceable, it was evidence that artists were serious
about moral rights.
As Siegelaub recognized, formal legal enforcement of contractual provisions is not
the only way rights are created and disputes are resolved in the art world257 They are the
exception to the rule. When collectors make promises to artists they have incentives to
keep those promises, other than the threat of a breach of contract action. Collectors want
to maintain a friendly relationship with artists, not only to ensure that the artist's
disapproval doesn't harm the market value of the work they already own, but also to
ensure that they will have access to more works in the future.
More often than not, the most valuable legal rights are those you will never have to
assert. Indeed, "legal" rights may be valuable even if they cannot formally be enforced.
While the Artist's Contract is largely unenforceable, collectors no doubt still respect its
terms because in negotiating the transaction and signing the contract, they "accepted" its
terms on a deeper level than a legal one. They may act according to it not because bound
them legally but because it persuadedthem-it came to shape or to express their values
as well. In this sense, the Artist's Contract can be seen as an element of the works it
purports to regulate, and may even increase their value. The Artist's Contract purports to
benefit collectors, as well as artists, and ironically, maybe it does. Perhaps there are
reasons to use legal language and legal documents, even if there is neither an intention or
a capability to actually enforce any legal obligations.
V. THE ARTIST'S CONTRACT AND LEGAL CONscIOusNEss

Scholars of law and society have explored the ways in which legal documents serve
purposes that go beyond enforcement in courts. Among these purposes are to associate a
particular transaction or relationship with values that are thought to be associated with
law, such as formality, clarity, even legitimacy in the eyes of a given community or
political unit. The law, in other words, serves an expressive function, shaping individual
self-conceptions as well as broader societal beliefs.
As Lauren van Haaften-Schick has observed, the Artist's Contract reflects the desire
of many artists to maintain control over the work they produce, in order to shape its
presentation and meaning.25 8 It uses legal rhetoric to express the gravity of their
investment and concern. Essentially, the Artist's Contract reflects an attempt to shape the
"legal consciousness" of the art world, to catalyze a shared understanding of artists and
collectors as to their mutual obligations and expectations.
The Artist's Contract is important because it reflects an effort among artists, dealers,
and collectors to create a mutually agreeable memorialization of a (purported?) shared
understanding between the parties, a recognition and acknowledgement of the ongoing
connection between the artist, the collector, and the artwork. Regardless of whether this
256 See EICHHORN, supra

at 29-30.
See id at 13.

257 See id.
258

note 86, at 39.
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is right or wrong, the legal document should be seen as a way of recognizing and
fonnalizing that ongoing connection in legal tenns. It's a way of challenging existing
assumptions about property ownership and the relationship between artists and their
work, and introducing new ideas of what equity, what justice, demands. The legal
trappings are used instrumentally, for all sorts of purposes, including socially and
politically organizing artists, but perhaps most of all developing a different relationship
between artists, art, and collectors after the sale of art. The idea is for the artist to have
more power (including financial rights) after the sale, but also to enlist the collector as an
ally through the use of legal language, clearly specified expectations, and explicit
agreement.

